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Abstract. This article, based on archival and published sources, examines the fate of one of the components of “Peter the Great’s legacy”, a powerful complex of state-owned metallurgical plants in the Urals. After the death of Peter I, his successors were faced with a choice: either to privatize the plants in accordance with Emperor’s intentions, or to leave them in state ownership and try to make a profit from the export of iron. A question arose that remains relevant to this day: is it more advantageous for the government to own enterprises directly or to transfer them to private ownership? The calculations of prominent managers — W.I. Henning and V.N. Tatishchev — promised large profits from the plants, which worked not only to preserve the old enterprises in state ownership, but also to build new ones. However, the state, having shown itself to be a good organizer of production, due to which iron production increased almost threefold in 25 years, turned out to be a bad trader, due to which the profit received was significantly less than expected. As a result, during the second quarter of the 18th Century, attempts were regularly made to privatize the state-owned Ural factories. The fact that they remained in state ownership by 1750 was the result of a confluence of circumstances that thwarted several attempts at privatization.
Keywords: Peter I, Ural, history of metallurgy, industrial policy, privatization, V.I. Gennin, V.N. Tatishchev.